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Occupation orders under the PRA
Professor Nicola Peart, the University of Otago
examines the jurisdiction to make such orders
S
ection 27 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976
gives the Court power to make an occupation order in
respect of the family home in favour of one spouse or
partner to the exclusion of the other. Such orders can only be
made if the home forms part of the relationship property. As
a result of the sharp increase in the number of family trusts
spouses and partners commonly do not beneficially own the
family home. In a number of cases their lack of ownership
has been held to preclude jurisdiction to make occupation
orders. Similarly, where the home is owned by a company,
the Courts have declined jurisdiction because the spouses or
partners had no property in the assets of the company. This
view misconceives the property requirement for occupation
orders. It construes the meaning of “relationship property”
too narrowly. Jurisdiction under s 27 does not depend on
ownership of the home, but on the right to possess it. This
paper will analyse the jurisdictional requirements of s 27 and
challenge the perceived lack of jurisdiction where the home is
owned by a trust or company.
OVERVIEW
Section 27(1) of the Property (Relationships) Act provides:
The Court may make an order granting to either spouse or
partner, for such period or periods and on such terms and
subject to such conditions as the Court thinks fit, the right
personally to occupy the family home or any other pre-
mises forming part of the relationship property.
Although the Court’s discretion is not fettered by any statu-
tory criteria (Doak v Turner [1981] 1 NZLR 18 (CA)), s 28A
mandates that the Court has “particular regard” to the
accommodation needs of the couple’s minor or dependent
children. A review of 28 cases decided since 2002 reveals that
occupation orders were made in 18 cases. In nine of these
cases the needs of children of the relationship were the
principal reason for granting occupation to the applicant
spouse or partner. In the other nine cases the personal needs
of the applicant (eg, Rawlings v Rawlings [2009] NZFLR
643 (FC)) or concerns relating to the property justified the
order (eg, B v B FC Porirua FAM-2005-091-917, 19 Decem-
ber 2006, affirmed, B v B HC Wellington CIV-2007-485-378,
20March2007).
The Act does not impose any limit on the duration of
occupation orders. An applicant could be granted occupa-
tion indefinitely or even permanently. Such orders are unusual
but not unknown. In DAM v PRM, FC Masterton FAM-
2008-035-512, 30 March 2011 the husband was granted
permanent occupation of the homestead to the exclusion of
his ex-wife; in Mark v Mark [2004] NZFLR 72, (2003) 23
FRNZ 128 the wife was granted occupation of the home for
as long as she had the care of the couple’s severely disabled
daughter. Generally occupation is granted for a relatively
short finite period or on an interim basis, pending sale or
division of relationship property. The review found that
orders for a finite period were made in six cases. In five cases,
the period ranged from four to 22 months; S v W HC
Auckland CIV-2008-404-4494, 27 February 2009 is excep-
tional with an order for five years. In ten cases, orders were
made pending sale or division of relationship property.
There are good reasons for restraint when exercising the
power to grant exclusive occupation to one of the parties of
the relationship. Because occupation orders are normally
sought after separation, they interfere with the clean break
principle and tie up the capital for the duration of the order (S
v W). Atkin and Parker also identify the trend towards
shared parenting and the accommodation needs of new
partnerships as reasons against granting occupation orders
(Bill Atkin and Wendy Parker Relationship Property in New
Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) at 11.4.1, eg, JKK v
LDK [2005] NZFLR 881).
Occupation orders were declined in nine cases and adjourned
in one case. In seven of the nine cases the reason was lack of
jurisdiction, mostly because the home was held not to “form
part of the relationship property”. The home was either in a
discretionary trust or owned by a company and thus not
beneficially owned by either of the parties. Even in the cases
where an occupation order was made in respect of a home
held in trust, the reasoning relating to the property require-
ment was generally muddled or flawed.
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
For the Court to have jurisdiction to make an occupation
order under s 27, the following requirements must be met:
a) The application must be made by a spouse or partner,
because the order cannot be made in favour of anyone
else, such as the children of the relationship (Babylon v
Babylon (2009) 27 FRNZ 622 (HC));
b) The application must relate to the “family home” or
“any other premises”. The family home is defined by
its use as the only or principal family residence (s 2).
Where the application relates to other premises, those
premises must be capable of occupation as a home;
c) The application must be for “personal” occupation by
the applicant spouse or partner. An occupation order
cannot be made for any other purpose. Thus, in LH v
BAH FC Christchurch FAM-2010-009-1775, 23 Decem-
ber 2010, the Court had no jurisdiction to make an
occupation order to enable the wife to control holiday
bookings of the parties’ rental property (as the appli-
cation had merit, the Court made a possession order
under s 25(3)). As the purpose of the order is to give
one spouse or partner occupation to the exclusion of
the other, the application is normally sought after the
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relationship has ended on separation or, occasionally,
on death. Nonetheless, jurisdiction is not dependent on
the relationship having ended. Section 25(3) gives the
Court power to make orders during the relationship
with respect to specific property, which could include
an occupation order to exclude one of the spouses or
partners from the home. In Stocker v Stocker (1978) 1
MPC 200 the Court held that as a matter of discretion
it could never be “just” to make such an order unless
the parties were separated. The need for such an order
may, however, arise in the context of domestic vio-
lence, in which case the order will generally be sought
under the Domestic Violence Act 1995 where slightly
different jurisdictional requirementsapply (ss52,53DVA);
d) the home or premises must form “part of the relation-
ship property”. The remainder of this article will address
this requirement.
“Part of the relationship property”
For the home to be “part of the relationship property”, either
or both of the parties must be the “owner” of the “property”
and the property must be “relationship property”. Section 2
of the Property (Relationships) Act defines “property” in
conventional terms as including:
(a) real property:
(b) personal property:
(c) any estate or interest in any real property or personal
property:
(d) any debt or any thing in action:
(e) any other right or interest.
The same section defines ownership also by reference to the
general law:
owner, in respect of any property, means the person who,
apart from this Act, is the beneficial owner of the property
under any enactment or rule of common law or equity.
As the family home or other premises is real property, juris-
diction under s 27 depends on either or both of the parties to
the relationship being the beneficial owners of an estate or
interest in the home or premises on ordinary common law or
equitable principles.
For the property interest to qualify as “relationship prop-
erty” it must come within s 8 of the PRA. As occupation
orders are normally sought in respect of the family home,
rather than any other premises, a property interest will be
relationship property unless the parties have agreed other-
wise by contracting out of the Act. In CM v TM FC Auckland
FAM-2009-004-1190, 25 November 2009, and EIS v LJN,
FC North Shore FAM-2010-044-1254, 30 June 2011, for
example, the couples had made an agreement under s 21 of
the Act classifying their family home as the husband’s sepa-
rate property. As the agreement was not void and had not
been set aside, the Court had no jurisdiction to make an
occupation order.
If the spouses or partners are the legal and beneficial
owners of the fee simple estate in the family home, that
interest will clearly be relationship property, absent a con-
tract classifying it as separate property (as in SM v LB HC
Auckland CIV 2010-404-2320, 22 October 2010; Rawlings
v Rawlings; and S v W). However, ownership alone is not
sufficient. An occupation order could only be made if at least
one of the parties also has the right to possess the home. That
is implicit in the nature of the order.
Where the family home is held in a discretionary trust or
owned by a company the spouses or partners do not benefi-
cially own the home. A commonly held view is that the Court
then has no jurisdiction to make an occupation order (Keats
v Keats [2006] NZFLR 470 (FC); C v H FC Hamilton
FAM-2008-019-992, 11 March 2009). Even if the spouses or
partners are beneficiaries of the trust, the established rule of
trust law is that they have no property in the assets of the
trust unless and until the trustees exercise their discretion in
favour of either or both of them (Kain v Hutton [2008] 3
NZLR 589 (SC); Hunt v Muollo [2003] 2 NZLR 322 (CA);
Johns v Johns [2004] 3 NZLR 202 (CA); Nation v Nation
[2005] 3 NZLR 46 (CA)). Similarly, if the parties are share-
holders of a company that owns the family home, they do not
beneficially own the company assets (S v S FC Hamilton
FAM-2006-019-1658, 15 February 2008). They merely own
the shares.
These views are an accurate statement of the law if juris-
diction to make an occupation order depended on either of
the parties beneficially owning the fee simple estate. But
occupation orders are not about vesting legal title. They
merely grant possession to one party to the exclusion of the
other party (s 27(2)). For purposes of s 27 the question is
whether either of the parties has a sufficient property interest
in the home for a possessory order to be made in favour of the
applicant.
To ascertain the nature of a spouse or partner’s interest in
the family home owned by a trust or a company, close
scrutiny is required not only of the terms of the trust or the
shareholder’s interest but also of the dispositive decisions by
the trustees or arrangements made by the company that
allowed one or both of the parties to occupy the home during
and after the relationship. This enquiry may reveal that the
parties do have a sufficient property interest in the home for
purposes of an occupation order.
FAMILY HOME IN TRUST
Where the family home is in trust the terms of the trust may
give either or both of the parties to the relationship a prop-
erty interest in the home.
Leases and licenses
The trust deed may grant the spouses or partners a lease of
the home, in which case they clearly have a property interest
that would be relationship property. Some trust deeds give a
couple a right of “personal occupation” of the home. It may
be deliberately so described to suggest that it is merely a
personal right — a licence — rather than a property right. If
so, the Court would have no jurisdiction to make an occu-
pation order. But the formal description may belie the true
nature of the arrangement. Given the nature and purpose of
the property it is more likely that the occupation right is a
property interest. The trustees would expect the couple to
exercise physical control over the home and determine who
should be permitted to enter and who should be excluded or
ejected. In other words, the couple would have exclusive
possession, which is a property interest (Fatac Ltd v Com-
missioner of Inland Revenue [2002] 3 NZLR 648 (CA); New
Zealand Fish and Game Council v Attorney-General (2009)
10 NZCPR 351 (HC)). Provided that right has not ended, the
Court would have jurisdiction to make an occupation order
subject to any limitations or conditions imposed by the terms
of the lease or right of occupation. In C v H FC Hamilton
FAM-2008-019-992, 11 March 2009 and EIS v LJN FC
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North Shore FAM-201-044-1254, 30 June 2011 there was
no jurisdiction because the right to occupy the home ended
on the death of the male partner.
Vested interest
If either of the parties has a vested interest in the home held in
trust, that interest will qualify as “property” within the
meaning of the Act and,
because the interest relates
to the family home, it will be
relationshipproperty.How-
ever, as with ownership of
the fee simple estate, title
alone is not enough. The
beneficiary must also have
theright topossess thehome.
The husband in Rangi v
Rangi FC Oamaru FAM-
2010-045-11, 17 February 2010 had such an interest. The
trust settled by his mother gave him a vested life interest in
the family home for his personal use. He and his wife
occupied the home during their marriage. After separation
the wife remained in the home and sought an occupation
order. Her husband’s entitlement under the trust to posses-
sion of the property was sufficient to give the Court jurisdic-
tion to consider the wife’s application. She failed because
Mr Rangi had greater need of the property.
The Court would not have had jurisdiction if, after sepa-
ration, the trustees had leased the home to a third party.
Mr Rangi’s life interest would have entitled him to income
from the property but not possession. Jurisdiction would
also not have existed if Mr Rangi had died. His life interest
would have ended, leaving no property interest in his estate
in respect of which an occupation order could be made. As it
happens, the trustees had granted Mr Rangi 40 per cent of
the equity in the home in recognition of his contributions to
the mortgage repayments. That interest would pass to his
estate on his death. Section 91(2), which modifies s 27 for
relationships ending on death, would then give the Court
jurisdiction to make an occupation order in favour his widow
“to the exclusion of any other person who would otherwise
be entitled to occupy the home”, which would include the
person entitled in remainder.
Contingent interest
A contingent interest in a trust is also a property interest
(John v Johns; Q v Q (2005) 24 FRNZ 232). If the contin-
gency is met, the interest is enjoyed as of right. For purposes
of an occupation order, however, the contingency must not
preclude the spouses or partners from occupying the home.
For example, a leasehold interest granted by trustees to a
couple conditional upon them living together could not be
the subject of an occupation order following separation,
because neither of them would then have a property interest
in the home.
Discretionary interest
If the trust is discretionary in nature, a spouse or partner’s
interest in the home will depend not only on the terms of the
discretionary interest, but also on the exercise of the trustees’
discretionary powers.
The terms of discretionary trusts are infinitely variable.
Some give the trustees only limited discretion, thus enhanc-
ing the beneficiaries’ interests in the trust property. In Yu
Ping Gao v Elledge [2003] NZFLR 378 (FC), for example,
the wife applied for an occupation order of an apartment
held in a trust of which she and her husband were the only
beneficiaries. The trust deed obliged the trustee to transfer
the property to the beneficiaries as and when they requested
her to do so. It also stipulated that nothing in the deed
deprived the beneficiaries of the right of beneficial owner-
ship, including the right of possession of the property, unless
they failed to perform their
obligations under the trust,
which included providing
the trustee with funds to
pay mortgage installments
or leasehold covenants. As
the Court concluded, those
terms conferred beneficial
ownership of an interest in
the apartment, which was
property within the Act. The apartment had ceased to be the
family home when the couple went overseas, but it was
relationship property at the time of the transfer into trust. As
the trust was settled by the parties, their beneficial interest
was relationship property pursuant to s 10. The Court there-
fore had jurisdiction to make the occupation order in favour
of the wife.
The trust deed in R v R [2010] NZFLR 555 (FC) was of a
more usual form, giving the trustees wide powers to appoint
income and capital to any one of the discretionary beneficia-
ries, including the parties. The trustees had exercised their
dispositive powers by passing a resolution granting Mr and
Mrs R the right to occupy the family home. That resolution
gave the parties exclusive possession of the home, which was
sufficient for purposes of an occupation order. There was no
need to rely on the ill-defined and controversial bundle of
rights doctrine to establish jurisdiction.
Many family trusts are not administered as formally as the
one in R v R. The parties are often the trustees, with or
without an independent trustee, and they tend not to observe
the formality expected of trustees administering property for
the benefit of others. The trust in Keats v Keats appears to
have been such a trust. Mr and Mrs Keats settled the trust in
2000 appointing themselves and a third party as trustees.
They were also beneficiaries together with their children and
a wide range of other family members. As trustees, Mr and
Mrs Keats had the usual wide powers in respect of income
and capital. After separation, they adopted a nesting arrange-
ment, taking turns to care for their children in the family
home. The trust deed was silent on occupation of the home
and, aside from a recent set of accounts, the Court had no
information about the trust or its administration. In the
absence of evidence about the parties’ right to occupy the
home, the Court adopted the conventional view of discre-
tionary trusts that neither party had a property interest in the
home and concluded that it had no jurisdiction to make the
order (at [20]).
Yet, Mr and Mrs Keats had occupied the home during
their marriage and continued to do so after separation,
seemingly without objection from even the independent trustee.
In the absence of a formal arrangement authorising occupa-
tion, could parties, such as Mr and Mrs Keats, nonetheless
have a sufficient interest in the home to qualify as “property”
for purposes of an occupation order? Assuming that at least
one of the parties is a discretionary beneficiary, the starting
point must be whether the parties’ occupation during the
Many family trusts are not adminis-
tered as formally as the one in R v R.
The parties are often the trustees
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relationship was authorised by the trustees. Such authority
may be expressly granted, as in R v R, or it could be inferred
from arrangements relating to the occupation. If the parties
were living in the home without objection from the trustees,
the conclusion that their occupation was authorised will
usually be irresistible. That will certainly be so if they are
paying outgoings on the home. If one of them continues to
live in the home after separation, his or her continued occu-
pation is also likely to be authorised until it is revoked. If
neither of the parties had authority to occupy the home, they
would be squatters and the trustees would be in breach of
trust for failing to take steps to remove them!
Whether their occupation was a property right or merely
a personal right takes us back to the earlier observations
about licenses. Where the authorised occupation relates to
the family home, the logical inference is that the parties have
exclusive possession. Their right to occupy the home must
imply their right to exclude others including the right to eject
and bring trespass actions against unlawful interference (Fish
and Game Council v Attorney-General).
This sort of reasoning was employed in DAM v PRM
FC Masterton FAM-2008-035-512, 30 March 2011 to grant
an occupation order of the homestead to Mr M. Mr M
had settled his farm on trust in 1975. To avoid problems
with estate duty, he was a trustee but not a beneficiary
of the trust (Estate and Gift Duties Act 1968, ss 11 and 12).
His wife was also a trustee as well as a discretionary
beneficiary together with their children and grandchildren.
After the parties separated in 2006 the trustees passed a
resolution granting Mrs M the right to occupy the
homestead. Her presence on the farm caused a great deal
of tension and disrupted her son’s running of the farm
and her husband’s ability to assist his son. Mr M applied
for an occupation order of the homestead. As he was not
a beneficiary of the trust, jurisdiction depended on his
former wife having a right to occupy the home. The parties
had divorced by the time the application was made. That
terminated Mrs M’s right to benefit under the trust. Her
continued occupation may therefore have been outside the
powers of the trustees. However, as she occupied the
homestead with the trustees’ consent, the Court held that
she had a property interest that was relationship property
and hence there was jurisdiction to grant Mr M the
occupation order.
Bundle of rights
The bundle of rights doctrine that has been invoked in
relationship property proceedings to bring trust assets within
the ambit of the Act has also been used to found jurisdiction
to make occupation orders (R v R [2010] NZFLR 555 (FC)).
Central to this doctrine is the settlor’s power to control the
trust for the settlor’s benefit, principally through the power
to appoint and remove trustees. As explained in Peart et al,
“Trusts and Relationship Property in New Zealand” (2011)
111 Trusts and Trustees 1, this doctrine is fundamentally
flawed. It disregards the trustees’ core duty to perform the
trust honestly and in good faith for which the trustees are
accountable to the beneficiaries (Armitage v Nurse [1998]
Ch 241; Spread Trustee Co Ltd v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC
13). In the context of applications for occupation orders the
bundle of rights has no place, because it is not the powers
which are at issue, but the exercise of those powers to confer
upon one or both of the parties to the relationship a property
interest in the family home.
Summary
Where either of the parties is occupying the family home held
in trust, he or she is likely to have express or implied
authority to do so. The right to occupy is a property interest
in the home that is sufficient for purposes of an occupation
order. Provided the right has not come to an irreversible end
and the other requirements in s 27 are satisfied, the Court
will have jurisdiction to make an occupation order in respect
of a home held in trust.
Varying the trust
If the Court has jurisdiction to make an occupation order and
decides to exercise it, it may be necessary to vary the terms of
the trust to give effect to the order. In DAM v PRM the Court
used its powers under s 182 of the Family Proceedings Act
1980 to remove Mrs X as a trustee to prevent ongoing
hostility and to appoint Mr M as a discretionary beneficiary
of the trust, at his election. That appointment was made to
enable Mr M to derive income from the trust. It would also
facilitate his continued occupation of the homestead.
The Court also has powers under s 33 of the PRA to make
ancillary orders to give effect, or better effect, to orders under
ss 25 to 32. Section 33(3)(m) empowers the Court to vary the
terms of an inter vivos trust. The Court could have used that
power not only to remove Mrs M as a trustee and add Mr M
as a discretionary beneficiary, but also to bind the trustees to
the order. In some cases further variation of the trust might
be necessary to ensure compliance with an occupation order
in favour of a former spouse or partner.
OWNERSHIP BY COMPANY
Similar scrutiny of possessory rights is required where the
family home is owned by a company. In S v S (2008) 27
FRNZ 352 (FC) each of the parties had a 10 per cent
shareholding in the farming company that owned the family
home. As neither of them beneficially owned the home, the
Court held that it had no jurisdiction. As in the case of a
home owned by a trust, the parties’ lack of ownership should
not have ended the enquiry. On what basis were they occu-
pying the home during their marriage? Did they have the
right to exclusive occupation? If so, did either of them have a
continued entitlement to occupy the home post separation? If
they did, that right would have been sufficient to give the
Court jurisdiction to make an occupation order in favour of
Mrs S.
CONCLUSION
Section 27 of the Property (Relationships) Act gives the court
jurisdiction to make occupation orders in favour of a spouse
or partner provided the family home forms part of the
relationship property. These orders do not vest ownership of
the family home in the spouse or partner. They merely grant
exclusive possession. For jurisdictional purposes, ownership
of the home is neither necessary nor sufficient. What is
necessary is an interest that entitles one or both of the parties
to exclusive possession of the home. The focus of the inquiry
should therefore be on the parties’ possessory rights, not
their ownership of the home. Provided at least one of the
spouses or partners has the right to possess the family home
when the application is made, the court will have jurisdiction
to make an occupation order even where the home is owned
by a discretionary trust or a company. r
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